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Introduction
The rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) and the increasing role played by large, multinational Þr m sh a v ebee nam on gstth em o stim po r tan td im e n sion soft h eco n tin uing globalization of the world economy over the past three decades. These developments have had profound effects on the attitude taken by governments towards the location of mobile Þrms in their jurisdictions. This is reßected in the policies governments have adopted in order to encourage investment by these Þrms.
One facet of this is the decline in corporate taxes as nations compete to attract investment. Table 1 shows that nominal and effective average rates of corporation tax have fallen signiÞcantly over the last two decades and this downward trend has been even more pronounced in small countries. Nevertheless, corporate tax rates remain substantial in large and small countries alike. Moreover, at least for the small countries the downward trend of tax rates seems to have slowed down during the period 1995-2005, as compared to the preceding decade. This offers some Þrst indication that there may be a 'bottoming out' of tax rate competition as economic integration proceeds. 1 ****** Table 1 Revenue from corporate taxation, as a percentage of GDP, has remained stable or even increased in most OECD countries during the last two decades (see OECD, 2007) . Corporate tax revenue may not be a good indicator for the forces of tax competition, however, because it includes the effect of Þrms switching from unincorporated to incorporated businesses in order to take advantage of falling corporate tax rates. Recent empirical evidence shows that this effect may be substantial, raising corporate tax receipts at the expense of personal income tax revenue (see de Mooij and Nicodème, 2008) . Nevertheless, the evidence on corporate tax collections underscores the point that proÞt taxation is not losing its importance. See Hines (2007) for a recent overview of these developments.
1
30% of the present value of the investment, have been approved. 2 The recent apparent decline in the number of such subsidies may, however, be Þrst evidence of a policy reversal in this area. In Germany, for example, an intensive debate on the justiÞcation of subsidies for increasingly mobile investments broke out in 2008, after Nokia had closed a mobile phone plant in Northrhine-Westphalia that had only been erected in the 1990s, with the help of state subsidies, and simultaneously opened up a new plant in Romania.
****** Table 2 about here ****** Finally, there are clear signs that increasing economic integration and the mobility of multinational Þrms have led to conßicting interests between large and small countries.
During the last decade large countries, in particular, have found themselves under increasing pressure to cut tax rates, in order to avoid losing investment to their smaller, lower-tax neighbours (see Table 1 ). In the EU, for example, this has led to the adoption of a Code of Conduct for business taxation that was directed primarily at the special tax breaks being offered to multinational Þrms. This regulation caused a total number of 40 preferential tax regimes to be phased out, most of which had been applied by small EU countries (see Primarolo Report, 1999) . 3 A tth esam etim eth eO E C D(2000)lau nc h ed a campaign against 'harmful tax policies', which was directed almost exclusively at small tax havens worldwide. Essentially these policy initiatives attempted to counteract the way in which small countries have taken advantage of an increased organizational ßexibility in large, multinational Þrms.
In this paper we aim to contribute to the understanding of these simultaneous developments. For this purpose we set up a model that incorporates a desire on the part of national governments to attract internationally mobile Þrms, but also gives governments the ability to tax location rents earned by Þrms. Countries differ in the size of their respective population. Our focus is on the development of tax rates and the resulting welfare levels in small and large countries as economic integration proceeds.
2 Davies (2005 , Table 1 ) collects a similar list of investment subsidies granted by U.S. states.
3 Examples of such preferential tax regimes were a split corporate tax rate regime in Ireland and special tax rules for multinational holding companies in the Benelux countries. Both of these measures were highly successful in attracting foreign direct investment.
More speciÞcally, we set up a model of generalised oligopoly in a region where two countries of different size use corporate taxes to compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical Þrms owned by residents of a third country. Our model features location rents for Þrms that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium. This is because, in the presence of trade costs, Þrms want to set up in different locations from one another in order to reduce the competitive pressures that they face and increase gross proÞts. This gives the host governments an opportunity to grab these rents through taxes. On the other hand, we assume that governments want to attract Þrms to their jurisdiction as consumers prefer locally produced goods to imports. Trade costs again drive this motivation. Local production is cheaper than importing goods and hence consumer prices are lower, and consumer surplus higher, when goods are made in the domestic market. 4 Other things equal, this makes governments willing to subsidise inward foreign direct investment. The overall tax policies in our model thus derive from the combination of these two counteracting forces.
Our model delivers two main results. First, we Þnd a U -shaped relationship between equilibrium tax rates and trade costs. Tax rates in both countries decline in the initial stages of economic integration but rise again when trade costs fall further. This pattern results as the relative strength of the two effects on tax policy described above changes in the course of economic integration. Second, we show that there is a range of trade costs where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfareinthelargecountry .Thisindicatesthat,atsomestagesofeconomicintegration, there may indeed be conßicting interests between large and small countries with respect to continuing the process of market integration.
The analysis is related to two strands in the literature. A Þrst set of papers focuses on the competition between potential host countries for a single multinational Þrm. In these models the equilibrium policy generally involves a location subsidy to the Þrm.
Reasons why countries (or states) will want to attract Þrms include: scale economies in the provision of public goods and services in conjunction with a mobile workforce (Black and Hoyt, 1989) ; positive spillovers from employment in the host jurisdiction (Haaparanta, 1996; Davies, 2005) ; savings in trade costs (Haußer and Wooton, 1999);  or technological backwardness (Fumagalli, 2003) . Recent work has shown, however, that these results change when an indigenous Þrm is already operating in one of the countries (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006) or when countries compete for two mobile Þrms, rather than one (Ferrett and Wooton, 2005) . In the latter case, countries may even be able to tax away all proÞts in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium. A general feature of these models is that they involve the comparison of discrete equilibrium allocations and analyse speciÞc scenarios that are difficult to compare or generalise.
A second literature strand has analysed tax competition for internationally mobile Þrms in models of the new economic geography (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck and Pßüger, 2006) . These models employ a framework of monopolistic competition where otherwise identical Þrms produce different varieties of a composite good. 5 This literature has stressed that agglomeration rents can be taxed, at positive levels, by the government of a "core country". However, this result applies only in the special case where all Þrms are agglomerated in one country, whereas subsidies are paid in equilibrium when Þrms are regionally dispersed.
In contrast the present model focuses only on interior location equilibria and shows that positive tax rates can arise even if Þrms are fully dispersed in equilibrium.
Our analysis develops as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3 analyses the non-cooperative tax equilibrium and the allocation of Þrms in the case where countries are symmetric and in the case where they differ in size. Section 4 derives the welfare effects of economic integration, again differentiating between the scenarios of symmetric and asymmetric countries. In section 5 we consider two extensions by incorporating an employment beneÞt from FDI and by allowing for local ownership of the active Þrms in the two competing countries. Section 6 concludes. 5 For an extension that accounts for Þrm heterogeneity, see Burbidge et al. (2006) . Another related analysis is Fuest (2005) who studies the implications for tax policy when economic integration reduces trade barriers but also increases the foreign ownership share of domestic Þrms.
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2T h e m o d e l
Consumers
We consider a region with two countries  and , which compete to attract a Þxed number of Þrms. These Þrms produce an homogeneous good, labelled ,ina no lig o po lis t ic industry. A second, private good, the numeraire commodity , is produced under conditions of perfect competition. Consumers in both countries have identical preferences for the goods, given by
The two countries potentially differ in size. The population of the region is normalised to unity and, without loss of generality, we take country  to be the larger of the two.
Let there be  ≥ 05 consumers in country  and (1 − ) consumers in country .T h e residents of countries  and  earn only wage income, while proÞti n c o m ea c c r u e st o capital owners that reside in a third (outside) country. 6 Every household in the region supplies a single unit of labour. The wage rate in each country is determined in the numeraire industry, which uses labour as the only input. Free trade in the numeraire good therefore equalises the wage across the countries as . Moreover, total income from the business tax (as detailed below), denoted by   , is redistributed equally and in a lump-sum fashion to the consumers in each country. The budget constraint for a representative consumer in each of the two countries is then
where   is the price of good  in country . Utility maximisation leads to inverse-
Aggregating the demand for good  over all consumers yields market demand curves for each country, denoted   :
When 05, the market demand curve of the larger country  is ßatter than that of country . In this sense market  i st h em o r ep r o Þtable one for Þrms, as we shall see below.
6 In section 5 we discuss the case where proÞt income accrues to the residents of countries  and .
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Firms
There are  Þrms in total, based in a third country and prepared to invest in the region. Each of these Þrms possesses one unit of "knowledge capital" (such as a license or patent) that can be proÞtably employed in the imperfectly competitive industry .
This factor is indispensable for the production of good  but limited in availability such that, at most,  Þrms can engage in production. In addition, each Þrm faces Þxed and identical costs of setting up a production facility in each of the two countries. These costs are assumed to be sufficiently large to ensure that each Þrm will set up, at most, one production plant in the region. Thus each Þrm will serve the regional market from either country  or country . 7 Firms are assumed to be identical except with respect to the location of their production facilities. Location matters because, while all Þrms can sell their products in both countries, there are trade costs associated with exports to a Þrm's foreign market. Thus each country's market may be served by both "local" Þrms that produce domestically and "foreign" Þrms that are based in the other country.
Labour is the only variable input in good  production. Each unit of good  requires the efforts of  workers, where  is chosen so that production of  does not exhaust each country's labour supply. Hence the marginal cost of production can be deÞned as  ≡ . Since wage costs are equalised between the two countries, they do not enter the location decision of Þrms in our model. The cost of exporting each unit of output is  ,w h i c he ffectively raises the marginal cost of serving the foreign market to
We are assuming that all of the trade costs are "real", taking the form of, say, transport costs or administrative barriers to the free movement of goods between countries. There are no (endogenously determined) tariffs between countries  and  as we assume that the region is a free-trade-area.
Firms are assumed to behave as Cournot competitors and are able to segment their markets, choosing the quantities to sell on their domestic and export markets indepen-7 If trade costs were sufficiently high relative to these Þxed costs, the Þrm might choose to "jump" the trade barrier and produce in both markets. We assume that this is not the case. We further assume that the trade costs between the region and the rest of the world are sufficiently high that no Þrm would choose to service the markets of  and  from a third country outside the region. For notational simplicity the Þxed costs are suppressed in the equations below.
6 dently. 8 The total operating proÞtofeac hÞrm, which equals the return to the required unit of knowledge capital, is thus deÞned as
where   is the pre-tax proÞto faÞrm based in country  and   represents sales in country  by a Þrm based in country  (  ∈ { }).AÞrm is at a cost disadvantage in its export market as the marginal cost of exports is higher than that for domestic sales. Consequently an exporter will sell less in a market than an indigenous rival.
Suppose that   Þrms are located in country  and the remaining   Þrms produce in country ,w h e r e  +   = . Maximising (4) taking into account demand (3), yields output levels per Þrm:
We focus on the cases where the trade cost is sufficiently low to ensure that    0   0 and each Þrm exports into the foreign country's market. From (5) and in the symmetric situation, where the host countries are the same size ( =05)andeac h attracts the same number of Þrms (  =   ), both countries will export if
We assume throughout the following analysis that this condition is met. 9 This constraint implies that trade costs remain below a critical upper limit, beyond which Þrms will only serve their domestic markets. For the symmetric case this prohibitive trade cost is
8 In equilibrium, Þrms will receive a lower producer price for their exports than for goods destined for the domestic market. The trade structure is simply a generalisation of the "reciprocal dumping" model of Brander and Krugman (1983) . 9 Note that (6) is also a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for exports to occur into both markets when countries differ in size and   6 =   . In this case it is seen from (5) that one of the conditions for    0   0 will involve an even tighter constraint on  .
We further assume that the resource constraints
(1 − ) are met and that the numeraire good is produced in each country. Observe that          1,conÞrming our assertion that a foreign Þrm's share of a market is always less than that of a local Þrm whenever there are trade costs (0). Equilibrium prices in each market are:
Notice that consumer prices in both countries fall when the total number of Þrms  increases and competition in the oligopolistic industry is thereby intensiÞed. Moreover, in each country the consumer price is a rising function of the number of active Þrms in the other country. In other words, whatever the size of the industry, having more Þrms producing locally intensiÞes domestic competition and drives down consumer prices.
Substituting (5) and (8) into (4) yields the pre-tax proÞts of Þr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y :
We assume that proÞts are taxed at source by the host countries of the Þrms. 10 Let   be the lump-sum tax imposed on each Þrm by country .T h e nt o t a lt a xr e v e n u e sa r e
The tax differential between countries is ∆ ≡   −   . In deciding upon where to invest, Þrms will compare proÞts net of taxes and locate in the more proÞtable country. The locational equilibrium for the industry is characterised by
gives the equilibrium number of Þrms choosing to locate in each country:
10 There is an agreement in the literature that international company taxation closely follows the source principle (Tanzi, 1995, Ch. 6-7) . This principle applies directly, if countries avoid international double taxation by exempting foreign-earned income from domestic tax. If countries grant an international tax credit instead, source taxation is still effective in many cases, because crediting applies only after proÞts have been repatriated and because countries do not rebate 'excess' taxes paid abroad.
Suppose, initially, that each country charges the same tax, that is ∆ =0. If the countries w erethesamesize( =05), it is clear from (11) that   =   = 2,thatis,theÞrms would be evenly split between the two locations. In the absence of trade costs, neither country has a locational advantage and   is undeÞned. When 0 and country  is relatively large (05), the second term in (11) is unambiguously positive due to the constraint (6). Differences in taxes will further affect the location of Þrms such that, if country  taxes Þrms more heavily than country  (that is, ∆  0), country 's share of the Þrms will be relatively smaller than it would otherwise be. However, as will be shown in section 3.2, the third term can never fully compensate the second and so the larger country will attract more than half of all Þrms in any asymmetric tax equilibrium [cf. eq. (20) 
Governments
The governments of countries  and  each impose lump-sum taxes on Þrms that locate within their respective jurisdictions. Importantly, these taxes can be negative, acting as subsidies to attract investment to a particular country. If revenues from the business tax are positive, then these are redistributed equally and in a lump-sum way to the residents in the country in which they are collected. The costs of a negative business tax are raised through lump-sum taxation of consumers. Recall that, despite their lump-sum character, business taxes still distort the location decision of internationally mobile Þrms [eq. (11)].
12
Governments maximise the welfare of their representative consumers. To derive aggregate welfare in each country, we use the budget constraint (2) to substitute out for the consumption of the numeraire good   in the individuals' utility function (1) 11 Our analysis treats   and   as continuous variables. Hence we only approximate the "true" model when the number of Þrms is small and the relocation of a single Þrm has discrete implications for the equilibrium allocation. Alternatively, we can conceptually introduce stochastic location decisions of Þrms and interpret   and   as the expected number of Þrms in each country. The main advantage of this procedure is that we can derive equilibrium allocations and policies as continuous functions of exogenous model parameters. 12 Introducing an ad valorem proÞt tax instead of a lump-sum tax on Þrms would complicate the algebra, but it would cause no further distortions and hence would not change our qualitative results.
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and employ the inverse demands to eliminate   . Further employing   =    and
, using the equilibrium prices from (8) in the market demand functions (3) and aggregating over consumers yields:
where   is country 's total consumer surplus in market :
Hence, given our speciÞcation of individual utilities, national welfare can be expressed as the sum of aggregate consumer surplus in market , and the money income of all consumers (the sum of wage income and tax revenue). 13 Consumer surplus in each country is rising in the total number of Þrms ,a st h i si n t e n s i Þes competition and reduces producer prices in both countries [cf. eq. (8)]. Moreover, a rise in the share of Þrms located in country  raises consumer surplus in that country but lowers it in country  because consumer prices are lower when more Þrms produce locally. This gives each nation an incentive to attract Þrms to its home jurisdiction.
14 3 Equilibrium taxes and location
Benchmark: Symmetric countries
We substitute (10), (11) and (13) in (12) and differentiate each country's welfare expression with respect to its own tax. We Þrst turn to the benchmark case where countries are identical in all respects. Hence we evaluate the Þrst-order condition for the optimal tax rates at  =05 and substitute the equilibrium allocation of Þrms (11), again using this restriction. This yields closed-form solutions for the common Nash equilibrium tax 13 Note that the wage income terms in (12) are constants and will thus not affect any of our results.
14 Clearly, savings in transportation cost are only one (analytically convenient) example of why governments may want to attract internationally mobile Þrms. This motive could, for example, be replaced by wage earnings that exceed workers' outside options, or by technological linkages that exist between the oligopolistic industry  and the production of the numeraire good . We will discuss these alternative settings in section 5.
10 rate:
where the superscript  stands for the symmetric case. These equilibrium tax rates reßect two fundamental effects that are at work in the present model.
The positive Þrst term in the square brackets arises from a location-rent effect.T h i s effect arises because Þrms want to locate in different markets, in order to minimise competition between them. Intuitively, starting from a symmetric equilibrium and moving one Þrm from country  to country  implies that each Þrm in country  now faces more intense competition in its home market. Since a Þrm's home market is relatively more proÞtable than its export market, the gross proÞts of each Þrm in  fall, whereas the gross proÞts of each Þrm that remains in  rise. This proÞtd ifferential implies that a location rent arises for each Þrm even in a fully symmetric equilibrium, and this rent can be taxed by the host government. 15 This location-rent effect becomes stronger with higher trade costs, as these increase the difference in proÞtability between the home a n dt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t s .
The second term in the square brackets of (14) is the source of a consumer-price effect, which is unambiguously negative from (6). When an additional Þrm enters a country, consumer prices fall and, as discussed above, this provides each country with an incentive to offer location subsidies to Þrms.
From (14) we can determine the critical level of trade costs  * at which the two effects just offset one another such that equilibrium taxes are zero:
For trade costs  * the location-rent effect dominates and equilibrium tax rates are positive, whereas for  * the consumer price effect is relatively stronger and equilibrium taxes are negative (that is, subsidies are given). Finally, neither effect has any impact in the absence of trade costs ( =0 ). In this case of costless trade, the Nash equilibrium taxes are zero as both governments and Þrms are indifferent to the 15 Algebraically, this effect can be shown by differentiating the gross proÞts that each Þrm earns in a symmetric equilibrium [eq. (9)] with respect to   . The resulting proÞtd i fferential between a Þrm that is located in country  and one that is located in  is just equal to the Þrst term in (14).
11 equilibrium pattern of Þrm location.
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It should be noted that governments are constrained in their ability to tax, as post-tax proÞts must remain non-negative for all  Þr m s ,o t h e r w i s es o m eo ft h eÞrms would choose not to produce. To derive this constraint, we subtract the tax rate in the symmetric Nash equilibrium (14) from a Þrm's pre-tax proÞts (9). Setting the difference equal to zero yields a critical value of trade costs :
Equation (16) whereas a high level of  increases the ability of a country to set high taxes. Only if  ≤ will all  Þrms be prepared to enter and produce in the region. We assume that this condition is met throughout our analysis.
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Comparing the critical value in (16) with the prohibitive trade cost determined in (7) shows that ≤   for all  ≥ 2. Hence, for most levels of , eq. (16) is the binding constraint in our symmetric model. When this constraint is met and all  Þrms make non-negative after-tax proÞts, then there will also be trade in equilibrium.
How are the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates affected by changes in the exogenous parameters of the model? Consider Þrst an increase in the total number of mobile Þrms in the economy. Differentiating (14) with respect to  yields
a n dt h u sa ni n c r e a s ei n unambiguously raises equilibrium tax rates. Intuitively, a rise in the total number of Þr m sl o w e r st h ec o s t st h a ta r ep e r c e i v e db ye a c hc o u n t r y 16 This special case is related to the analysis by Janeba (1998) , who introduces Þrm mobility to the standard model of strategic tax policy but does not include transport costs. He shows that equilibrium trade taxes will then be zero in both countries, in contrast to the trade subsidies that result in the absence of Þrm mobility (and with Cournot competition of Þrms). 17 More precisely, this critical value represents an upper bound on trade costs, as we have ignored the Þxed costs of locating in either country (see footnote 7). If these costs are explicitly incorporated, the maximum permissible tax rate, and hence the threshold value , are accordingly lower. 18 It is easily checked that the level  * , at which tax rates switch signs [eq. (15)], is below the threshold level . Hence there is a range of transport costs for which positive equilibrium taxes result.
from losing one of the Þrms to the other country. The decline in the consumer-price effect reduces the willingness of each country to grant location subsidies. Moreover t h el a r g e rn u m b e ro fÞrms strengthens the positive location-rent effect. The stronger is competition, and hence the closer prices are to marginal costs, the more severe is the disadvantage of having to bear extra trade costs. Hence, starting from a symmetric equilibrium, the penalty rises for a Þrm that attempts to escape high domestic taxes by moving abroad, and this strengthens the ability of each country to tax location rents.
The comparative static result (17) makes it immediately clear that countries will not
Þnd it in their interest to reduce the total number of active Þrms in equilibrium. Since each country's tax rate is rising in ,s om u s tb et a xr e v e n u e .M o r e o v e r ,c o n s u m e r surplus [eq. (13)] is clearly a positive function of . Hence welfare in each country [eq. 12] is monotonously increasing in the number of active Þrms.
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Our main interest lies on the effects of changes in trade costs. Differentiating (14) with
which may be positive or negative, in general. However, we can determine a critical threshold value for  for which this derivative is zero. This is
For  * * , the tax rate is rising in trade costs, whereas for  * * it is falling in  .
Moreover, comparing (18) with (15) shows that  * *  * 2.
****** Figure 1 about here ******
The relationship between the level of trade costs and the equilibrium tax rates in the symmetric Nash equilibrium is then as shown in Figure 1 . We interpret economic integrationasanexogenousreductionintradefrictions.TheÞgure shows that, starting from high levels of trade costs ( * ), a fall in these costs will reduce the ability of symmetric countries to raise positive business taxes. Below  * taxes turn negative and continue to fall until they reach a minimum (i.e., a maximum subsidy) at  * * .T o explain this negative relationship for relatively high levels of trade costs, note that the location-rent effe c ta n dt h ec o n s u m e rp r i c ee ffect are both weakened when trade costs are reduced. However, the ability of countries to extract location rents falls more quickly as long as  * * . If trade costs fall still further ( * * ), the relative strength of the location-rent and consumer-price effects is reversed and tax rates rise again until they reach zero at  =0. Our results for the symmetric benchmark are summarised in:
Proposition 1 In the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates can be either positive or negative. As economic integration proceeds (trade costs are continuously reduced), equilibrium tax rates fall from positive to negative levels and then rise again, equalling zero when trade costs are eliminated.
Differences in country size
Having discussed the basic working of our model under symmetry, we now turn to the more general case where countries differ in size. We obtain closed-form solutions for the asymmetric Nash equilibrium tax rates, which are derived in the appendix:
where
The Þrst term in (19) is identical for both countries and captures the counteracting location-rent and consumer-price effects that have been discussed above. 20 The second terms in (19) show how the overall bargaining position of countries vis-à-vis individual
Þrms is modiÞed by an additional home-market effect.E a c hÞrm will save aggregate trade costs and thereby make higher gross proÞts when it locates in the larger country. This allows the larger country  to impose a higher tax than in the symmetric equilibrium, whereas the smaller country  has to compensate Þrms for its location disadvantage by offering a lower tax (or a higher subsidy). Hence the larger country levies the higher tax rate in equilibrium for any positive level of trade costs. 20 It is easily checked that the Þrst terms in (19) reduce to eq. (14) for the symmetric case  =05.
14 Our analysis focuses again on the effects of falling trade costs. We Þrst turn to the question of whether economic integration will increase or decrease the concentration of Þrms in the larger country. This is determined by substituting the optimal tax rates in (19) into equation (11), yielding
Differentiating (20) with respect to  gives:
Hence a fall in trade costs unambiguously increases the number of Þrms in the larger country . On the one hand, lower trade costs reduce the disadvantage that a Þrm has from settling in the smaller market. There is a second effect, however, which is dominating in our analysis. Trade costs shield the Þrms that locate in one market from the competition of Þrms that have located in the other. As trade costs fall, the competitive pressure rises relatively more in the small country , because a larger number of Þrms (those in ) become closer competitors. In sum, therefore, market integration increases the concentration of production activity in the larger market .
Equation (20) also implies that a threshold level of trade costs, denoted  ,m u s tb e exceeded in order to ensure that a positive number of Þrms locates in the small country  (i.e.,   ). This lower bound for  in the presence of size asymmetries is given by
The lower bound  is zero in the case of symmetric countries and it rises as the size differential between countries  and  increases. In other words, if low levels of trade costs (and thus a high degree of economic integration) are to be considered in our model, then the size asymmetries between the two countries must not be "too large".
Next we consider the effects of economic integration on the tax rates imposed by each country in the asymmetric tax equilibrium. Differentiating (19) with respect to  and re-substituting the tax rates in the initial equilibrium yields:
Hence, for either of the two countries, a positive tax rate in the initial equilibrium is sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure that a fall in trade costs reduces the optimal tax rate. This result parallels that for symmetric countries. However, from (19), the critical level of trade costs at which the large country's tax rate turns positive is now reduced relative to the symmetric case, whereas the critical level of trade costs at which the small country is able to levy positive taxes is increased. The relationship between t r a d ec o s t sa n dt a xr a t e si nt h et w oc o u n t r i e si st h e na ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 .
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****** Figure 2 about here ******
Our results for the case of asymmetric countries are summarised in:
Proposition 2 Consider two countries that differ only in size. As trade costs fall, () tax rates in both countries Þrst fall and then rise again, with the larger country imposing the higher tax rate at each level of  ; () the concentration of Þrms in the larger country increases.
Economic integration and national welfare
We now turn to the welfare effects of economic integration and start again with the benchmark case of symmetric countries. Substituting (10), (13) and (14) in (12) and setting   =   = 2 yields the maximised welfare for each country
Differentiating with respect to  yields
For high levels of trade costs, economic integration (a fall in  ) is welfare-reducing for both countries; while for low trade costs, a further reduction is instead welfareincreasing. The critical value of trade costs where welfare reaches a minimum is obtained by setting    in (24) equal to zero. This critical value is:
This U -shaped relationship between national w e l f a r ea n dt r a d ec o s t sc l o s e l ym i r r o r s the relationship between equilibrium tax rates and trade costs. At high levels of trade costs, a reduction in these costs weakens the location-rent effect, reducing the taxing power of governments and lowering both tax revenue and welfare. 22 At low levels of  , a further fall in trade costs reduces the gains for each country from granting location subsidies to Þrms. This alleviates subsidy competition and increases each country's welfare. Comparing the critical level to the level of trade costs that induces the minimum tax  * * [see eq. (18)], shows that * * . Thus, as trade costs fall below , tax rates continue to decline for some range of trade costs to the left of while welfare starts to climb again. The increase in welfare is explained by the fact that the falling tax revenues (alternatively, the increasing subsidy payments) are more than compensated by the rise in consumer surplus associated with the reduction in trade costs.
To anal yse the effects on national welfare when countries differ in size, we substitute (11), (13) and (19) in (12). At low levels of economic integration, equilibrium taxes are positive in both countries and a reduction in  will cause taxes and welfare to fall. However the welfare-minimizing levels of  will differforthelargeandthesmall country. Given that welfare in each country is a non-monotonic function of trade costs, there is the possibility that economic integration will have the opposite welfare effect in each country over a certain range of  . In particular, it can be shown that this is the case when the trade cost is equal to ,a sd e Þn e di n( 2 5 ) .A tt h i sl e v e lo ft r a d ec o s t s (and, from continuity, in the neighbourhood of this value), the following holds:
This leads to:
Proposition 3 T h e r ei sar a n g eo ft r a d ec o s t sf o rw h i c he c o n o m i ci n t e g r a t i o n( af a l l in  ) reduces welfare in the larger country but increases welfare in the smaller country.
Proof: See the appendix.
22 This result implies that countries would have an interest in restricting trade in the early stages of economic integration. We assume, however, that countries regard the level of trade costs as strictly exogenous, the path of economic integration having been predetermined by, say, multilateral trade negotiations or "single-market" treaty obligations.
Proposition 3 is explained from the fact that both the location-rent effect and the consumer-price effect are weaker for the small country. The smaller country is the less attractive location from the perspective of Þr m s ,b u ti ta l s oh a sf e w e rc o n s u m e r sa n d therefore has a smaller incentive to grant location subsidies. For this reason, country 's welfare level   reaches its minimum at a higher level of trade costs as compared to   . As trade costs fall below this minimum of   ,e c o n o m i ci n t e g r a t i o ni sb e n e Þcial for the small country, but still detrimental for welfare in the large country . where we assume that  =06. The results are summarised in Table 3. ****** Table 3 about here ****** In this particular numerical example the upper limit of trade costs that still ensures non-negative after-tax proÞts is ≈ 068,w h e r e a st h el o w e rl i m i tf o r that ensures an o n -n e g a t i v en u m b e ro fÞrms in the smaller country is  ≈ 010. Columns (1) and (2) show that     holds for all levels of trade costs [Proposition 2(i)] and country 's tax rate turns negative at a higher level of trade costs than that of country .I n columns (3) and (4) tax rates are calculated as a percentage of gross proÞts.T h isr a t io approaches unity in both countries at . As is seen in column (5) this ratio initially declines more steeply in the smaller country as trade costs are reduced, but then the tax difference shrinks again. Column (6) shows that the number of Þrms in country  rises continuously as trade costs fall [Proposition 2(ii)]. Finally, columns (7) and (8) give the per-capita welfare level in each country. Comparing these two columns for any given level of  shows that welfare is always higher in the larger country, which hosts a larger number of Þrms and thus beneÞts from both lower transport costs and stronger competition in its market. 23 For changing levels of  , these results conÞrm that there 23 There is an interesting contrast here to the literature analysing tax competition between countries is a range of trade costs  ∈ (015 025) where a small reduction in  lowers welfare in country , but raises welfare in country  (Proposition 3).
These results of our model are roughly consistent with the patterns of corporate tax adjustments in large and small countries, as given in Table 1 . This table shows that in 1985, at the onset of economic integration, tax rates were at a "maximum" level that was similar for large and small countries. In the early phases of economic integration, tax rates fell more in the small countries, leading to a substantial tax gap between large and small countries by 1995. As economic integration continued, the large countries also cut their tax rates and the tax gap between large and small countries narrowed during the period 1995-2005. As is shown in column (5) of Table 3 , the initial widening and later narrowing of this tax gap is captured by our model, if (analytically more convenient) lump-sum taxes on each Þrm are transformed into ad valorem proÞttaxes.
Finally, even though there are many differences between our model and those used in the new economic geography (NEG) literature, it is interesting to point out some of the contrasting implications. A core difference is that positive tax rates are possible in our model even in a fully symmetric equilibrium, whereas equilibrium tax rates are always negative in NEG models when Þrms are regionally dispersed in the locational equilibrium (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005) . 24 Moreover, if all Þrms are concentrated in one of the countries, the optimal tax rate of the country hosting the agglomeration is an inversely -shaped function of trade costs, whereas it is -s h a p e di no u ra n a l y s i s .
These differences can be traced back to the existence of a location-rent effect in our model, which arises because Þrms make positive proÞts in equilibrium. In contrast, NEG models typically assume endogenous market entry which drives each Þrm's proÞt to zero. Hence no taxable location rent arises in either country and the location-rent effect accordingly disappears.
of different size in models of perfectly competitive factor and product markets (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991) . As in our analysis, this literature Þnds that the smaller country levies the lower capital tax rate. However, due to the absence of either location or competitive effects in these analyses, the small country attains a higher level of per-capita utility than its larger neighbour, because its lower tax rate leads to a higher capital-labour ratio in equilibrium. 24 See their Proposition 3. Note that there is an error in part () of this proposition. In the case where countries are equal-sized, equilibrium tax rates will be negative (and not zero) in both countries. We thank Tanguy van Ypersele for clarifying discussions on this issue.
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This section discusses two extensions of ourbasicmodel.First,w eaddanemplo ymen t beneÞt from attracting foreign Þrms. This is likely to be an important policy issue in practice. One approach to modelling this is to assume that workers in the -industry receive a wage premium over what can be earned in the numeraire sector. 25 Hence all households are employed, but the -industry offers the "better" jobs. In this case there is an additional component to welfare maximization, as a wage premium from employment in the -industry is added to consumer surplus and tax revenue. Even though the higher costs of producing good  will reduce consumer surplus, this is more than compensated by the extra wage income. Hence each government has a stronger incentive to attract investment. This results in lower taxes, or higher subsidies, being paid in equilibrium, fully reßecting the additional beneÞt from hosting the mobile Þrms.
One difference from the consumer surplus motive for attracting investment is that the wage premium will be (largely) independent of trade costs. Hence while economic integration reduces the ability of countries to tax location rents, it does not reduce their desire to attract Þrms for employment-related reasons.
However, in addition to consumer surplus, some other beneÞts from foreign direct investment will fall when trade costs decrease. For example, if the industry's product were a differentiated good and consumers had a liking for variety, reduced trade costs would give consumers increased access to those varieties produced in the other country.
In a yet different setting where the -industry produces a differentiated intermediate good, attracting additional Þrms would reduce aggregate transport costs borne by the Þnal goods sector and increase this sector's competitiveness. In each of these cases the gains from attracting investment would decline with economic integration, as in the case of consumer surplus. Hence when any of these arguments is incorporated in the national welfare function, tax rates and welfare will continue to be a -shaped function of trade costs, as in our benchmark analysis.
Secondly, we allow for the case where all Þrms are owned by the residents of countries  and , with shares in proportion to their population size. The appendix shows how local after-tax proÞt income is incorporated in the national welfare functions and derives 25 The full analysis of this case is available from the authors upon request.
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the Þrst-order conditions for nationally optimal tax rates. In this extended setting the algebra becomes very complex and uninstructive, however, when countries differ in size.
We therefore rely on simulation analyses, using the same numerical speciÞcation as in Table 3 above. The results are given in Table 4 . ****** Table 4 about here ****** Table 4 shows that tax rates are generally lower in both countries as compared to the benchmark case (see Table 3 ). This is because the negative effect of taxes on after-tax proÞts is now partly borne by domestic residents. Nevertheless, the location-rent effect is still present since some part of the taxes levied by each country continues to fall on foreigners (the residents of the other country in the region). Hence, for sufficiently high trade costs, a positive tax remains optimal in both countries. Moreover, economic integration shows the familiar -shaped pattern for welfare in both countries, as in our benchmark case. Note, however, that in our benchmark analysis economic integration hurts the countries in the region by reducing their ability to tax Þrm owners outside the region. This argument is no longer present when all Þrms are owned by residents of countries  and . Instead the critical effect is now that a fall in per-unit trade costs will lead to higher volumes of inefficient trade in equilibrium. Hence the total amount of wasteful trade costs Þrst rises and then falls as trade costs are continuously reduced (see Brander and Krugman, 1983) . For high level of trade costs, this effect dominates the pro-competitive effect of market integration and lowers welfare, whereas at low levels of trade costs a further reduction in these costs is unambiguously welfare-increasing. It also remains true that economic integration beneÞts the small country and hurts the large one for intermediate levels of trade costs. In fact, the parameter range where these conßicting welfare effects arise is enlarged, relative to our benchmark case in Table 3 . Another result of our model is that economic integration can simultaneously beneÞt small countries and harm large countries. This result may be relevant for several of the recent policy debates in the area of international tax coordination, such as the elimination of preferential tax regimes pursued simultaneously by the EU (Primarolo Report, 1999 ) and the OECD (2000). Many of these policy initiatives are led by large countries trying to counteract the effects of increasing economic integration, whereas they are targeted at small countries that are perceived to be the beneÞciaries of continued economic integration.
Finally, the location rents that arise in our static model derive solely from the fact that Þrms will want to locate in different jurisdictions in order to reduce competition between them in the presence of trade costs. Each Þrm makes its location choice once and any subsequent relocation between host countries is not considered. An extended model could incorporate Þrm relocations, associated with positive relocation costs, in an intertemporal framework that distinguishes between initial location subsidies and proÞt taxation in a later period. Relocation costs would then add to the location rents that Þrms earn in their present location, increasing the taxing potential for host governments. It is known from the literature on tax holidays (e.g. Doyle and van Wijnbergen, 1994 ) that, when governments cannot commit to future policies, they compete more aggressively via location subsidies in the Þrst period, as each government is aware of the advantage of attracting Þrms to its country when the investment is partially sunk.
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To the contrary, if economic integration were to reduce relocation costs over time, then initial investment subsidies may fall as there would be fewer proÞt taxes to be captured later. Incorporating these intertemporal aspects into a model of tax competition for a mobile industry is a challenging task for future research.
For country  we proceed analogously. Using (19) and (20) Since Ω   0 from 1 and 05, it follows that    |  0,a ss t a t e di n( 2 6 ) .
Section 5: Domestic Þrm ownership
With domestic Þr mo w n e r s h i pa l l o c a t e di np r o p o r t i o nt op o p u l a t i o ns i z e ,t h ew e l f a r e expressions for each country, inclusive of after-tax proÞt income, change to
where   isgivenin(13),  is in (9) and   is in (11). Differentiating yields the following Þrst-order conditions for optimal tax rates (in structural form):
T h e s ev a l u e sa r eu s e di nt h es i m u l a t i o n so fT a b l e4 .
